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Behind the Map: Crises and Crisis 
Collectives in High-Tech Actions 
 
Fiona Gedeon Achi 
 
Introduction 
Ushahidi, meaning testimony in 
Kiswahili, is among the many mapping 
platforms that belong to the now growing 
field of crisis mapping.
1
 Broadly defined, 
crisis mapping is the use of crowdsourcing 
to create online and interactive maps of 
places undergoing a crisis. In other words, 
what all crisis mapping projects have in 
common is their reliance on live maps in 
regions that are deemed “crisis-affected”–a 
map than can be continually updated and 
thus displays information in real time. As a 
blog-post on crisis mapping specifies:   
“The term crisis [here] is 
deliberately broad, from 
slow-burn crises to sudden-
onset disasters. Crisis 
Mapping is certainly not 
restricted to political crises 
but may include social and 
environmental crises, for 
example.” (Meier 2011a). 
The Ushahidi mapping tool was crafted in 
the midst of the post-election turmoil in 
Kenya at the end of 2007 by a group of 
bloggers and developers in an effort to 
counteract the government’s ban on 
mainstream media and document the 
violence happening in the country. Shortly 
thereafter, the Ushahidi platform was made 
available online for download by all. At that 
point, the Ushahidi team announced that it 
would maintain its responsibility as non-
profit tech company, developing and 
improving software, but would not be 
                                                          
1
 Please refer to the Annex at the end of this paper for 
a snapshot of an Ushahidi mapping platform accessed 
online. Knowing how it looks might facilitate the 
understanding of this essay.  
involved in actual crisis mapping projects, 
referred to as deployments by crisis 
mappers.
2
 Today, Ushahidi, having been 
used in all five continents, is certainly one of 
the crisis mapping tools most widely relied 
upon by people wishing to launch their 
project on a purely voluntary basis.
3
 A 
report issued by the United States Institute 
of Peace states that, as of June 2010, the 
Ushahidi platform had been downloaded 
3,746 times and they were 280 active 
deployments (Heinzelman and Waters 
2010). 
Furthermore, Ushahidi crisis 
mapping projects are highly mediatized, 
particularly since the Haiti deployment 
following the January 2010 earthquake, 
which was reckoned and depicted as an 
enormous success in the crisis mapping 
sphere. Many Ushahidi participants—as 
well as outside observers—have commented 
on their engagement in crisis mapping 
projects through blog-posts, newspaper 
articles, and talks. These multiple sources 
reveal that Ushahidi deployments vary 
widely in their intentions, ranging from 
practical humanitarian intervention to a 
willingness to turn the crisis map into a 
research data pool. 
This paper takes one Ushahidi-based 
project as entry-point to investigate the 
fascinating phenomenon of crisis mapping 
as it become ‘alive’. I have had the 
opportunity to engage extensively with 
members from the Ushahidi 2011 DRC 
project, which took place during the last 
presidential elections in the Democratic 
                                                          
2
 For instance, crisis mappers would say the “2007-
2008  Ushahidi Kenya deployment” to refer to the 
Ushahidi map and concurrent efforts activated during 
the Kenya post-election crisis. 
3
 Hence when I write Ushahidi in the reminder of this 
essay, I refer to the mapping tool and not to the 
Ushahidi tech company, nor to any non-governmental 
organization, unless I specifically write “the Ushahidi 
tech company”. 
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Republic of Congo in November and 
December 2011. I use this particular 
deployment as a way to move beyond an 
understanding of crisis mapping that relies 
predominantly on the vision held by its 
founders or most vocal advocates. One of 
the major features of Ushahidi is that it can, 
and has been taken up by people across the 
world for small or big deployments, 
sometimes without much contact with 
Ushahidi’s core team. 
Given the nature of the fieldwork 
undertaken, with individuals setting up the 
deployment rather than people in Congo 
sending reports to the map, this paper offers 
an inevitably partial account of crisis 
mapping and one that would be productively 
complemented by further imaginative 
research with those who ‘feed’ the map. 
Nonetheless, it situates itself as one of the 
first ethnographic studies on the crisis 
mapping phenomenon and its relevance for 
the discipline of anthropology. In particular, 
the Ushahidi 2011 DRC case study suggests 
that, at least in some instances, the deep 
significance of crisis mapping cannot be 
grasped through an understanding of the 
goals and success or failure of its projects. It 
is rather to be found in the space of 
collaboration brought forth by the 
coordination of the deployments which 
generates a new manner of “living crisis” —
understood both as participating in a crisis 
and a different way of thinking about the 
state of crisis itself. If Ushahidi’s developers 
wished to democratize the medium of 
mapping to ensure better information 
transmission, crisis mappers reach beyond a 
representational modality: crisis mapping 
globalizes the opportunity to collectively 
intervene in crises situations.  
Finding the point in incoherence 
Ethnographies, as the Writing 
Culture debate has made explicit, are 
representations of reality and thus cannot 
present the (objective) reality as such. Faced 
with this issue of recounting, anthropologists 
have often resorted to ideal types.
4
 For this 
ethnography, an initial temptation would be 
to rely on Patrick Meier’s vision of crisis 
mapping—Meier being the Director of 
Crisis Mapping at Ushahidi, the co-founder 
of the International Network of Crisis 
Mappers, as well as an eloquent speaker and 
blogger. Indeed, Meier coined the term 
‘crisis mapping’ in 2006 when creating the 
Center for Crisis Mapping and Early 
Warning at Harvard University. For Meier, 
as can be garnered by his many writings, 
crisis mapping is a humanitarian enterprise: 
its raison d’être is to trigger and facilitate on 
the ground practical action. His major 
concern is reaching technical solutions to 
ensure the uploading of “true” reports 
crucial for the coordination of rescue 
operations or other kinds of assistance. 
Many Ushahidi projects in fact share in this 
orientation. Hence, I had initially set up to 
undertake an epistemological analysis of 
crisis mapping conceived as an emerging 
form of humanitarianism, inquiring into the 
new knowledge production practices 
stemming out of Ushahidi deployments. 
However, on closer investigation, I became 
aware that a rising number of projects 
escape such categorization.  
Initially, most deployments were 
coordinated by the same small team of 
Ushahidi participants—generally people 
already involved, in some way or another, in 
Ushahidi’s original deployment in Kenya. 
As crisis mapping becomes more 
widespread, the Ushahidi platform is taken 
up by a vaster circle of individuals. In the 
last two years, many projects have been 
launched by individuals trying the mapping 
technology for the first time. These 
                                                          
4
 I here obviously borrow Weber’s famous phrase 
from The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of 
Capitalism. 




coordinators experiment with the potentials 
offered by the mapping tool without having 
one definitive goal in mind when starting a 
crisis map; they explore election monitoring, 
data analysis, humanitarian intervention, etc. 
In other words those who participate shape 
what crisis mapping is, one could argue, 
through every crisis map deployed.  
This capacity for constant 
modification is further explained by the fact 
that there is no such thing as an official 
crisis mapping body which centralizes and 
coordinates all crisis mapping deployments. 
At the 2011 International Conference for 
Crisis Mapping, Patrick Meier declared in 
his opening speech: 
As many of you already 
know, the CrisisMappers 
Community is an informal 
network of members who 
operate at the cutting edge of 
crisis mapping and 
humanitarian technology. We 
are not a formal entity; we 
have no office, no one 
location, no staff, and no core 
funding to speak of. And yet, 
more than 3,000 individuals 
representing over 1,500 
organizations in 140 
countries around the world 
have joined this growing and 
thriving network (2011c). 
The words show that while the 
International Network of Crisis Mappers 
aims to promote close collaboration and 
exchange between the whole of crisis 
mapping actors, no organization has the 
power to regulate how crisis mapping 
projects should be coordinated and to what 
aims. Some initiatives have established their 
own set of guidelines, but these diverge 
greatly between the different crisis mapping 
players (for example, the tech company 
Ushahidi vs. HealthMap). Furthermore, 
none of these guidelines are (legally) 
binding. For example, the Ushahidi website 
puts at users’ disposal a large number of 
training resources or procedures to be 
followed in order to achieve proper 
verification of data collection. Yet, the 
reliance on such guidelines is not a 
prerequisite for subsequent access to the 
Ushahidi technology. Incoming Ushahidi 
participants can even come up with their 
alternative procedures and publicize them.  
 In addition, the particularities of 
crisis mapping technology per se contribute 
to the explosive diversity in crisis mapping 
projects. Many of the software products 
mobilized are free or open source. This 
means that people can modify, improve, and 
distribute any part of the software’s source 
code. Moreover, most mapping tools, such 
as those developed by Ushahidi, are free in 
the sense of available at no cost. Although 
different “crisis mappers” might rely on the 
same software mapping platform they can 
adapt them for their own needs and bring 
their effort in any direction they like. The 
ethnographic study of the Ushahidi 2011 
DRC map aims to show that this variety of 
aims and viewpoints is found even within 
one deployment. 
 This loose framework encourages the 
constant proliferation of crisis mapping 
enterprises, which innovate both in the 
intentions of the projects and in the manner 
of carrying them out. Even Patrick Meier 
has recognized this situation when in a 
recent blog-post: 
“And then, easily the largest 
and most decentralized 
‘group’ of all [crisis 
mappers], are all those 
‘anonymous’ individuals 
around the world who launch 
their own maps using 
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whatever technologies they 
wish and for whatever 
purposes they want.” (2012). 
Reading crisis mapping through the lenses 
of humanitarianism and epistemology, 
therefore, only runs the risk of essentializing 
the enterprise and missing what it is 
(becoming) about. Certainly, such an 
approach would greatly simplify both 
ethnographic research and ethnographic 
accounts. However, implied in this 
methodological stance is the presupposition 
that I know, before fieldwork, what crisis 
mapping is.  
At the same time, neither do I aim to 
map every possible project since crisis 
mapping’s inception. This would only lead 
me to become one of the members of the 
College of Cartographers from Jorge Luis 
Borges’ poetic short piece, “On Exactitude 
in Science”. In this tale, the geographers of a 
mythical empire are so absorbed in their 
search for the perfect cartography that the 
map of the empire they produce is a full-size 
replica of the empire’s territory. Borges 
narrates that: 
“Less Addicted to the Study 
of Cartography, Succeeding 
Generations understood that 
this Widespread Map was 
Useless and not without 
Impiety they abandoned it to 
the Inclemencies of the Sun 
and of the Winters.” (Borges 
1999: 325) 
Obviously, this is not my wish for the 
current essay. Yet, I want to depict the 
stakes of crisis mapping while resisting the 
impulse to define and circumscribe it, using 
my case-study as entry point into a first 
understanding, rather than as representative, 
of crisis mapping.  Neither do I investigate 
whether the achievements that Ushahidi 
participants purport to reach are realizable 
nor realized. Rather, I attempt to do 
something similar to what anthropologist 
Kathleen Stewart refers to as “weak theory 
in an unfinished world”. In the eponym 
article, she states that: 
“For me, then, the point of 
theory now is not to judge the 
value of analytic objects or to 
somehow get their 
representation ‘right’ but to 
wonder where they might go 
and what potential modes of 
knowing, relating, and 
attending to things are 
already somehow present in 
them as a potential or 
resonance.” (Stewart 2008, 
73). 
I suggest that attending to crisis 
mapping beyond a concern for both 
ethnographic and mapping representation 
might actually be the only manner to reach 
an accurate portrayal of the phenomenon. 
This essay investigates the possibility of an 
ethnographic writing that values the 
incoherence at the heart of worldly 
manifestations. Certainly, it seeks to make a 
consistent argument about crisis mapping, 
but it argues that such an endeavor does 
necessitate ample simplification or 
generalization. I will show that attention to 
the complexity within and between Ushahidi 
projects is precisely what made me able to 
capture the potential triggered by crisis 
mapping. It became apparent that the 
particularity of the latter resides, not in 
practical goals, intentions, or effects, but 
rather in its opening up a new mode of 
living crisis. The significance of crisis 
mapping is not unrelated to the aims of its 
deployments, but is definitely not reducible 
to them. Understanding what modes of 
knowing, acting, and relating this different 
vision of crisis entails constitutes the 
remainder of this essay. 




Presenting Ushahidi Maps 
Maps are often equated with 
technologies of power: this idea strongly 
permeates discourses about maps (Massey 
2005: 106). The beginnings of cartography 
often coincide with colonial expansion (for 
instance Latour 1987). Maps are modes of 
knowing the world and its space in ways that 
often distorts them. Indeed, the cartographer 
does not depict the environment as it is—by 
merely copying trees and rivers—but 
portrays the world through a certain political 
landscape. For instance, British maps 
illustrate the expansion of their colonial 
empire as if countries such as India or South 
Africa were indeed geographically English 
(Anderson 2006: 175). Maps serve to 
reinforce artificially drawn boundaries by 
projecting them onto the natural physical 
world. As such, maps act on space. In 
addition, these cartographical 
representations are relied upon—by those 
who have access to them—to govern others. 
The distinguished geographer Brian Harley 
thinks about maps, in discussion with 
Foucault’s writings, as a form of knowledge 
(making) implicated in the deployment of 
power apparatuses, such as the law or 
military campaigns (Harley 2009: 130-1). In 
the end, maps are tools of domination that, 




An epistemological analysis of most 
crisis mapping maps would unveil the same 
representational caveats. The dimensions of 
                                                          
5
 I am here oversimplifying the long and complex 
history of mapping—particularly by passing over 
other cartographical movements that have attempted 
to reach beyond totalizing and controlling projects.  I 
allow myself this simplification for two reasons this 
simplification for two reasons. First, there is an 
important and highly mediatized rhetoric of crisis 
mapping which insists on the need to democratize 
information.” Then, the issue of crisis mapping 
situating itself within the genealogy of maps as 
instruments of control has been times and again 
raised to me 
selectivity (and bias) are strongly present in 
Ushahidi crisis maps. When setting up a 
deployment, the coordinators of the project 
come up with a certain number of categories 
into which the reports are classified—for 
example, water resource issues or physical 
abuse. Each map lists only certain forms of 
incidents (for example, the Haiti crisis map 
concentrated on material damages) while 
silencing, one could argue, other types of 
occurrences (such as psychological 
traumas). Furthermore, the data displayed on 
the platform is simply obtained through 
people sending messages via email, SMS, 
and Twitter or creating reports out of 
(already very selective) media news. Hence, 
some regions of the map, some days of the 
crisis, or some kinds of events might receive 
greater coverage than others. There is no 
real attempt to attain any systematicity in the 
spatiotemporal representation of the crisis 
under consideration.  
Nevertheless, concluding from such 
an examination that Ushahidi maps are 
another system of control amounts to 
missing the novelty (and history) of crisis 
mapping. Ushahidi was precisely born out of 
a willingness to create a mapping 
methodology that could accommodate the 
contributions of anyone wishing to 
participate in its endeavors (insofar as the 
reports target the focus of the map). The 
goal of the first deployment in Kenya was to 
come up with a means through which people 
in the country could communicate what the 
government did not want to broadcast to the 
rest of the world, namely the violence and 
the brutality in the post-election period. 
Obviously, this anyone wishing to report 
entails the condition of having the 
possibility of reporting to the crisis map. 
Yet, in many instances, this does not require 
much as one could even write down a report 
and pass it along to someone who has access 
to a cellphone or computer. 
Gedeon Achi: Behind the Map
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
119 
 
Furthermore, the map does not 
belong to any entity (governmental or 
otherwise) which then builds on the data to 
coordinate its regulatory or practical 
procedures. It is true that some Ushahidi 
deployments have partnered with non-
governmental organizations or international 
organizations. As an example, the Libya 
Crisis Map (deployed to monitor the 2011 
revolts in the country) was affiliated to UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UN-OCHA). Nonetheless, Ushahidi 
maps are publicly available on the web to 
use by all and an organism should not 
restrict its use to a certain group of people. 
Most certainly, critics of crisis 
mapping have pointed out the danger that 
some badly-intentioned individuals might 
take up the information collected for 
unwanted aims, or might even misreport to 
compromise the deployment (DeRosa 2011; 
Williams 2011). As of the writing of this 
paper, I have not heard of any such 
“hijacking” of the map. Regarding the report 
of inexact information, Ushahidi participants 
acknowledge that this can happen 
independently of people intentionally 
sending false information. A well-
intentioned individual might create a 
message based on something that he has 
heard from someone, but the location or 
details of the event might not be accurate. 
This is why the Ushahidi tech team, Patrick 
Meier, and Bharathi Ram (involved in the 
2011 DRC map) put a heavy emphasis on 
verification. Verification consists in 
triangulating a report by checking for its 
occurrence in various media sources. 
Also of interest is the fact that crisis 
mapping projects use mapping backgrounds 
that are already existent. They rely on 
Google Maps or Yahoo Maps to which are 
superimposed the elements being tracked 
(incidents of violence, material damages, 
etc.). These maps do not present us for the 
first time with new geopolitical contours. 
They rather work with the mainstream 
default cartographical situation. Crisis maps 
supplement the topographically delineated 
regions. To the regular world partitioning, 
they add voices, trajectories, and individuals 
interests—all of which have the potential to 
challenge the current geopolitical situation.  
Therefore, crisis mapping 
democratizes, at least in some respects, the 
process of mapping by implicating a vaster 
number of “cartographers” and opening up 
the use of the map to a broader public. In 
that sense, crisis maps could be said to offer 
a liberating alternative to the vision of maps 
as instruments of control. Crisis mapping 
brings forth a form of cartography that, 
although cannot be said to be an objective 
representation of reality, is perhaps more 
valid because it strives to take into account a 
potential infinity of points of view and leave 
open to each individual the option to act on 
the map as she sees fit. 
These observations highlight part of 
the significance of crisis mapping and had to 
be made explicit to counteract the 
conception of Ushahidi as implicitly, yet 
inevitably, oppressive. Indeed, whether or 
not the cartographical democratization is 
fully achieved is not what is at stake. What 
should be acknowledged is that crisis 
mappers want and try to democratize the 
mapped form of representation (see 
Ushahidi webpage, ‘About us’).  
Reaching further, this paper wishes 
to show that Ushahidi crisis maps constitute 
an altogether different kind of cartography. 
If the map per se constituted the essential 
focus of the early deployments, the spread of 
the Ushahidi platform has been 
accompanied by a move that I call “behind 
maps”. Put differently, crisis mapping has 
engendered a kind of collective initiative 
where the mapping part of crisis mapping 




drops out of the equation to give freeway to 
the crisis part. Ushahidi stimulates a kind of 
cartography that is not reducible to the 
representational power of the map or to its 
consequences for action. This will be made 
clear through the ethnographic study of the 
Ushahidi deployment that tracked the 2011 
presidential elections in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  
Once in Congo: Trying and Learning 
Galya and I met in her office in the 
little country-style building that houses the 
Center for Forced Migration Studies at 
Northwestern University (NU). Outside, in 
the midst of February, students walked 
across campus through the biggest snow 
storm of the year. A dense and dream-like 
curtain of snowflakes covers bodies, roofs, 
and the atmosphere. It is hard to believe that 
the Ushahidi 2011 DRC mapwas launched 
from this Midwestern suburban town. A 
couple of months back, in November and 
December 2011, Galya (a professor of 
International Studies) and her research 
assistant Liz have coordinated an Ushahidi 
map dedicated to follow the presidential 
elections in the Democratic Republic in 
Congo (hereafter DRC). 
 As we shake hands to introduce each 
other, Galya tells me  that Liz and she are 
currently making a video to explain the 
workings of Ushahidi to a Congolese 
Church community somewhere in Illinois. 
They are trying their best, she explains, as 
neither of them has much experience with 
filming. As Galya leads me into her office—
and  I am focused on removing my coat, 
scarf, gloves, and hat and getting a pen and 
notebook out of my backpack without 
covering her desk with snow—the topic of 
conversation switches to my involvement 
with Ushahidi. Then, Galya returns to 
describing her experience with Ushahidi.  
 She had encountered the Ushahidi 
mapping tool by chance, while searching for 
a (regular) map of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo she could show to her students in a 
course on sexual violence and justice in the 
DRC that she was teaching in the fall of 
2011. She recounted with a communicative 
enthusiasm: 
I was amazed at how you 
could just see the incidence 
of sexual violence, the 
distribution of incidents, etc. 
I thought that I could use it 
for my research. I was 
interested in the relationships 
between sex violence, the 
location of rebel groups, 
mining projects and other 
projects (such as agricultural 
ones, etc.). So, I contacted 
Juliana [Rotich, Executive 
Director of Ushahidi] and I 
became the manager of the 
DRC map. 
In other words, Galya wanted to deploy the 
Ushahidi map to collect crowdsourced 
information about violent abuses occurring 
during the 2011 DRC elections in the hope 
of turning it into data usable for research 
purposes. To secure efficient reporting on 
the map from the DRC, Galya recounts that 
she went to this country in November 2011 
to buy two Congolese SIM cards from the 
main phone operators, Airtel and Vodacom. 
This, she said, was supposed to ensure that 
most people could report without any cost to 
the map since texting within the same 
mobile network is free of charge (i.e Airtel 
to Airtel). Another reason of her trip was to 
establish contact with NGOs on the ground 
to facilitate and promote on-the-ground 
reporting to the Ushahidi map.  
Once in the DRC, she tried to access 
the crisis map launched some weeks back 
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but the webpage was each time extremely 
slow to load; it would take almost five 
minutes only to have a full view of the 
homepage. When deciding to coordinate the 
2011 DRC map, she had thought that reports 
on the map—sent via email, text messages, 
Twitter or even drawn from mainstream 
media—would have been accessible to 
anyone, especially in the DRC. That was her 
motivation: “to allow people on the ground 
to have their voices heard.” and to “amass 
all the reports [by Congolese on the ground] 
in ‘real time’ for use by all” (Ruffer, 
“Election Monitoring in the DRC”). With a 
precarious Internet connection in the three 
southern regions covered by the Ushahidi 
deployment, accessing the map turned 
impractical—nearly unfeasible—for people 
physically present in the DRC. Furthermore, 
not only was accessing the map in the DRC 
a problem, but the possibilities of real time 
reporting were almost cut to zero, as both 
Galya and her student Liz acknowledge.  In 
fact, Galya tells me, the SMS network was 
shut down a few weeks before the elections 
in order to prevent possible social unrest 
generated by this form of communication. In 
a country where mobile phones are much 
more widespread than Internet connections, 
text messaging would have represented the 
main source of instant reporting. 
Yet, despite this connectivity issue 
(which significantly reduced the chance of 
obtaining valid and accurate information 
regarding incidents of violence), Galya and 
Liz did not give up on the map. Quite on the 
contrary, they contacted the Standby Task 
Force (SBTF)—a large group of volunteers 
dedicated to support crisis mapping 
projects—to obtain assistance in “media 
monitoring” efforts. At that point, Galya and 
Liz chose to rely on mainstream media to 
create reports from articles and video 
documents to be uploaded on the Ushahidi 
platform. In most instances, this meant that 
by the time the incident appeared on the 
virtual map at least half a day had passed. 
Indeed, this kind of reporting through the 
outsourcing of news sources requires a 
sizable commitment from the volunteers 
helping in creation of reports. Volunteers 
have to go through media websites and read 
over many articles to identify the relevant 
incidents. I participated in this media 
monitoring endeavor in early December and 
I recall that even its coordination was 
complicated, the aim being to avoid 
duplicate reports (incidents that gets covered 
more than once). In addition to this, more 
than twenty SBTF volunteers helped in the 
filtering and analysis of Twitter messages 
about the 2011 DRC election before 
converting them into reports. Although 
realizing that the DRC crisis map would not 
fulfill their expectations in terms of data 
quality, Galya and Liz continued to explore 
new manners in which at least some 
information could be collected. 
 Moreover, they kept elaborating 
different manners in which the crisis map, 
with its information, could be put to use. In 
fact, the (practical) aims of the 2011 DRC 
project have changed and multiplied over 
the course of the elections, and were still 
being debated as I was writing this paper. 
Her team tried to reach out to the Congolese 
diaspora because “they are just as interested 
as those back home and, as seen in the 
numerous international post-election 
protests, are trying to influence the situation 
even from afar.” Here resided the mystery of 
the video mentioned by Galya at the start of 
our meeting. Galya and Liz hoped that, if 
they train members of the Congolese 
diaspora in using the Ushahidi 2011 DRC 
map, these people might rely on the 
collected information for advocacy 
purposes.  
There is a beautiful material 
illustration of this layering of goals. In the 
document that the 2011 DRC team sent to 




any incoming volunteer (entitled “DRC 
SBTF Election Team Instructions”), the 
original overarching objective of the 
deployment is listed at the top of the first 
page: 
“The SBTF will be 
monitoring online news 
sources, looking for specific 
incidents of violence, fraud, 
etc. The goal of our 
deployment is to provide 
comprehensive/conclusive 
evidence to the Congolese 
people as to the legitimacy 
(or lack thereof) of their 
elections.”  
Then, if one scrolls down to the end of the 
Google doc, one will find (nearly by chance) 
a tiny last section entitled A Little More 
About the Deployment’s Main Goals, where 
two other aims have been noted, simply 
complementing the previous one. This 
written superposition points to the image of 
an irregular pile of things that has been left 
there in a hurry. Indeed, the first additional 
goal is just a reformulation of the original 
one, as if the latter had already been partly 
forgotten.  It reads:  
“To provide feedback on the 
election's legitimacy to the 
Congolese people. We have 
many partners on the ground 
in the DRC with whom we've 
been sharing the map, and it's 
been very well-received so 
far.”  
As for the second extra goal, its tone is very 
hypothetical, showing an awareness of its 
ambitiousness and a determination to try 
nevertheless: 
“To, if possible, provide 
information on humanitarian 
needs to NGOs during the 
election. Given the 
expectation (and reality) of 
election/post-election 
violence, we are hoping to 
identify real-time where 
humanitarian assistance is 
needed. We have partner 
NGOs on the ground who are 
interested in having this info 
in order to go to those 
locations with help. This is 
probably the most difficult 
part of the deployment, 
because it's very hard to get 
real-time information from 
the news media. However, 
we have other means that 
we've been using for this 
purpose (SMS, email, etc.).”  
This willingness to orient the 
deployment toward various paths, even 
probably impossible ones, echoes what 
Galya told me at the beginning of our 
conversation: “This [the 2011 DRC map] 
was for me a learning experience in real 
time”. Then, a few hours later in a private 
discussion, Liz confided the same thing with 
almost identical words. And then she 
insisted: “This was for us an opportunity to 
try crisis mapping”. The conception of crisis 
mapping as learning experience is what 
pushed Galya and Liz to attend to the 
generative capacity of technical constraints. 
They were eager to discuss the manner in 
which—once a technical or other type of 
obstacle was made visible—they made the 
project become something else. The 
potentialities that the combination of the 
software, the DRC, and their team made 
possible were key, whereas the actual 
humanitarian (or other types of) results 
brought forth by the map per se receded into 
the background.  
Bharathi’s involvement as one of the 
main coordinators of the Ushahidi 2011 
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DRC project is also illuminating in this 
regard. From my exchanges with her, I 
understood that she started to get involved in 
crisis mapping because in her view, this is a 
humanitarian enterprise that “has had” and 
“will have” impact (for example to help 
people during natural disasters or reduce the 
violence during elections). Bharathi 
conceived of the 2011 DRC deployment as 
purely driven toward academic purposes (to 
gather data): “there was no humanitarian 
organization on the ground to act on 
reports”. Yet, despite the fact that her more 
pragmatic goals were not pursued in this 
project, Bharathi committed extensively to 
it. She would spend several hours per day 
training new volunteers or writing down 
instructions about how to analyze reports. 
 In the case of the 2011 DRC 
elections map, the participants I talked to 
never spoke in terms of the failure or 
success of the project as a whole. Galya and 
Liz shared with me their enthusiasm about 
Ushahidi beyond the impossibility to obtain 
real-time reporting. Bharathi encouraged the 
deployment even if its focus did not achieve 
what she deems the obvious objective of 
crisis mapping, namely practical 
humanitarian action. Certainly, participants 
discussed and worried about the map’s 
accuracy. However, they were intensively 
involved in crisis mapping while 
simultaneously acknowledging the many 
problems in data collection and verification. 
This ethnographic case suggests that for its 
participants the value of crisis mapping 
cannot rest solely on the representational 
validity of the map nor on the results 
(political, economic, etc.) it engenders. The 
truth of reports becomes secondary with 
respect to the collective project of actually 
receiving and uploading reports and of 
building a map that embodies a careful 
concern for the political events at stake.
6
 
In the end, Galya, Liz, Barathi and 
their partners did not aim to modulate nor 
influence the geographical space being 
mapped. Through my exchange with them, I 
became aware that the representational 
strength and the thrust for action of the crisis 
mapped did not make up their main 
preoccupation. Rather, I will show that crisis 
mapping with its growing involvement of 
volunteers in the production process of 
Ushahidi maps reconfigures the space of 
crisis. 
When Crisis Mapping Becomes in Fact 
Mapping Crises 
The deep commitment of the 2011 
DRC team, despite issues with reporting and 
the lack of practical intervention in the 
deployment, prompts my understanding that 
maps and their effects are actually not the 
end product of all crisis mapping. I entered 
into conversation with Galya, Liz, and other 
people thinking that maps were the focal 
point of crisis mapping. However, my 
engagement with them turned my attention 
back to crisis, and intensely so. This was a 
stark reminder that one is dealing with a 
particular object of mapping. Ushahidi maps 
are not tracing territories or delineating 
administrative regions. Under scrutiny in 
Ushahidi deployments is not the 
geographical setting per se, but the crisis 
(natural disaster or political unrest) 
occurring in the specific location. Crisis 
maps, as the name indicate, document crises.  
In his provoking article “Disaster, 
Crisis, Revolution”, the literary scholar Eric 
                                                          
6
 Interestingly, this is also the case of the 2011 DRC 
deployment. In one of her emails to me, Liz wrote: 
“Fyi though, verification was one of the last things I 
was worrying about, so there's a chance some reports 
are up on the site that should be verified but have not 
been, just because I was rushing.” 




Cazdyn calls for a new and productive way 
to conceive the category of crisis. He does 
not dictate the path but insists that our 
ordinary mode of apprehending crises 
through “preempt[ing] them” is treacherous 
(Cazdyn 2007, 650). To illustrate this point, 
he provides the example of pharmaceutical 
industries’ expansion. These distribute an 
incredible number of products supposed to 
prevent cancer and other life-threatening 
diseases. However, he argues, so doing 
creates the danger of many other related-
crises, such as the propagation of mental-
illnesses because of over-medicalization or 
the regime of exclusion inherent to 
pharmaceutical access (Cazdyn 2007: 655-
57). In other words, Cazdyn believes that a 
preemptive approach to crisis is merely the 
conductor to never-ending and bigger crises. 
Somewhat daringly, I contend that crisis 
mapping constitutes one alternative 
understanding of crisis sought for by 
Cazdyn. 
 Crisis mapping cannot pretend to be 
aiming at preventing crises from emerging 
as such. The technology is neither designed 
to negotiate political agreements nor to 
predict natural disasters. Rather, crisis maps 
are deployed where and when crises happen, 
after they have happened. During my few 
months of research, I have never heard any 
claim stating that crises are to be eradicated 
as a state of affairs per se. Crises are simply 
assumed to be always recurring. One can 
read on the website on the Standby Task 
Force (the group of volunteers mentioned 
earlier): “the quiet time in-between [crises] 
is important for a volunteer network; not 
only to collectively catch our breaths but 
equally importantly to innovate” (Meier 
2011d). The very notion of standby implies 
the constant awaiting of an imminent crisis. 
In addition, crisis is presented at the default 
status—the “quiet time” is simply the 
interval between the previous crisis and the 
next one (that will, it is thought, happen for 
sure). That crisis mappers consider crises as 
circumstantial givens is further shown by the 
fact that the concept of crisis is always 
treated as unproblematic in crisis mapping 
documentation (blog posts, reports on 
deployments, etc.). Crises are qualified but 
are never defined per se. For example, 
Anahi Iacucci, a consultant on several 
Ushahidi projects (in Chile and China), 
reminds us that “crises can be financial, 
ecological, humanitarian, etc., but these 
crises all happen in time and space, and 
necessarily interact with social networks” 
(Iacucci 2012). To this list, Meier has added 
that crises can also be political and social. 
Yet, the threshold between a merely 
unstable situation and a situation of crisis is 
not explicated. 
 This perceptual omnipresence of 
crises is one of the targets of Cazdyn’s 
paper. He states that “to justify such a 
system [of preemptive measures leading to 
inequalities], there will be the employment 
of a permanent state of crisis and disaster” 
(Cazdyn 2007: 657). Yet, crisis mapping has 
not resulted in the public’s impression that 
the occurrence of crises has increased 
worldwide. In fact, crisis maps are deployed 
in settings already portrayed as “crisis-
affected” by mainstream media or 
governmental action—such as Haiti after the 
earthquake, Syria during the Arab Spring, or 
the Democratic Republic of Congo during 
tense political elections. Thus, Ushahidi 
deployments feed on already established 
crises rather than promoting the belief that 
crises’ incidence has multiplied. It seems to 
me that the anthropological significance of 
crisis mapping lays elsewhere: in its having 
opened a new mode of collectively acting on 
crisis. Paying attention to the dynamic 
character of the map—a feature necessary to 
follow crises in real time— reveals that 
Ushahidi cartographical production is the 
site from which this different manner of 
living crisis emerges. In the next section, I 
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will show that this mode living crisis is 
characterized by a collective that exceeds 
mapping but for whom the condition of 
crisis is central.  
Awakening Maps 
Both Galya and Liztold me that in 
their view one of the greatest strengths of 
the Ushahidi map is that of allowing people 
to express different stories from those put 
forward by the European Union or the 
Carter Center with regards to the elections in 
the DRC. Liz specifically explained that 
those international organizations are aware 
of abuses due to the elections but do not 
publicize them in order to avoid any further 
uprising of the population. In an 
unintentionally and vaguely Foucauldian 
formulation, Liz made clear: “We do not 
want to promote violence either…But 
knowledge is power and people have the 
right to know”. Her claim is reminiscent of 
the first deployment of Ushahidi in January 
2008, during the Kenya post-election crisis. 
The intention was to trace a narrative 
through the reporting on the map that was 
different than that transmitted by the Kenyan 
state. According to the Ushahidi initial team, 
the state hid information or displayed the 
wrong information in order to keep the 
political and economic situation as it was. 
Galya echoed this stance by stating that the 
international organizations in the DRC all 
partook in “data control”. In both cases, 
participants claimed that the portrayal 
entertained by the state and official 
organizations does not correspond to what is 
happening in the region mapped.  
On a similar note, Heather Ford, an 
ethnographer of online communities 
currently working as a consultant for 
Ushahidi, thinks that the effectiveness of 
crisis mapping rests on its producing “joint 
memory” through its force as moral 
witnessing.
7
 Hence, if the opportunity for 
alternative expression and communication is 
insisted upon as key function of the mapping 
technology, several crisis mappers never 
indicate the benefit of the (interactive) 
mapped display over other forms of data 
presentation that could well suit the purpose 
of storytelling (blog, online forums, online 
open forums, etc.).  
Since these ethnographic cases 
illustrate how little mention is made of the 
gain obtained by the medium of mapping for 
deployments’ objectives, they suggest that 
the attractiveness (and hence development) 
of crisis mapping rests on other technical 
facets of the mapping tool: its easy 
availability and its dynamic nature 
independent of mapping. The fact that 
Ushahidi software products are publicly and 
freely available encourages anyone to try 
them “during a future crisis”. Moreover, 
Ushahidi has recently developed a lighter 
version of its platform, called “Crowdmap”, 
which takes around five minutes to install on 
a computer (I have tried it). This is actually 
how Galya got acquainted with Ushahidi in 
the first place—she simply bumped into the 
2008 DRC election map. Her interest rose 
when she learned that she could download 
the platform and start her own map quickly 
and without needing any permission.  
I will focus more closely on the 
second aspect in this essay—the 
requirements of the live aspect of the map. 
These are twofold. On the one hand, the 
obtaining of reports through crowdsourcing 
is grounded on the assumption that people in 
                                                          
7
 Incidentally, Heather Ford has criticized Patrick 
Meier’s vision of crisis mapping for being too 
focused on reaching statistical truth and thus missing 
what crisis mapping is about—“provid[ing] a 
platform for people to report on what was happening 
to them or around them” . See 
http://hblog.org/2011/12/07/why-the-muggle-doesnt-
like-the-term-bounded-crowdsourcing/, accessed 
April 27, 2012. 




the region in crisis will want to contribute to 
the map (for whatever reason: political 
resistance, hope for better humanitarian 
action, etc.). On the other hand, the 
willingness to portray crises as they unfold 
require a permanent upkeep of the map by 
people working non-stop to advertise the 
map, sort reports, and upload them.  
Bridging Distance (and Time): Living Crises 
The number of crisis mappers 
engaged in launching and maintaining the 
map was quite restricted at the beginnings of 
Ushahidi. The founders of Ushahidi had 
imagined that a small group of dedicated 
and expert developers would do their best to 
try to manage as many crisis mapping 
projects as possible. Yet, over the last years, 
the amount of individuals willing to partake 
in the updating of the map has been steadily 
on the rise. Some crisis mapping projects 
have witnessed the involvement of over 100 
individuals (for example in the case of the 
Haiti map or the Libya Crisis Map)! If the 
developers of Ushahidi had expected the 
vast participation of people on the ground 
because the urgency of the crisis was staring 
them in the face, they had not anticipated 
that so many people not physically present 
in the crisis-driven country would cooperate 
in Ushahidi projects. They had not 
envisioned the joining in of all these 
individuals who each through their 
computer, in the safety of their offices or 
homes, in London or Chicago, would come 
together in times of crises.
8
  
Whereas other forms of crisis 
interventions, such as NGOs, require one’s 
to be physically present in the region 
affected or necessitate some form of 
                                                          
8
 One might indeed argue these conditions are still 
quite discriminatory and I can only agree. Yet, the 
point of this paper is that crisis mapping, although 
perhaps not perfect, permits participation and acting 
in crisis more easily to a growing number of people 
around the globe. 
training, anyone (with an Internet 
connection) can witness and take part in the 
unfolding of a crisis through crisis 
mapping—in a way that is more active than 
simply reading news. Before their 
involvement in crisis mapping, crises were 
for most Ushahidi participants things 
unfolding out there of which one heard 
about but about which one was not 
concerned personally. As Ushahidi 
participants, they are brought into these 
crises. As such, crises happening in a distant 
country become of concern to individuals 
updating a crisis map. Crisis mapping 
pushes its contributors beyond merely 
knowing that crisis X is happening in 
country Y—it implicates them in the events 
in a manner that they put their mark on it 
(through filtering reports or uploading them 
on the maps, coordinating media monitoring 
tasks, reflecting on how to achieve the 
biggest coverage of SMS reporting, etc.). I 
would also argue that it is acting in a crisis 
that differs from the making of donations to 
crisis-relief organizations. It is more active 
because it does signify the delegation of 
intervention to another entity but already 
encompasses the monitoring of crises. 
Furthermore, contrary to money giving, 
crisis mapping is a collective endeavor 
grounded on collaboration. 
Not only does crisis mapping allow 
people to enter crises from anywhere but it 
permits to do so without any substantial time 
commitment. Beginner participants might 
perhaps need to dedicate some hours during 
their first deployment to learn the basics: 
how to log into the map platform, how to 
navigate the mapping tool, how to create a 
report, etc. However, after this minimal 
(self) training, the volunteering schedule is 
up to oneself. There are indeed some tasks 
that truly permit a short-lived and low-
requirement involvement (such as deleting 
ReTweets). In addition, as the number of 
volunteers increases, the time required from 
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each of them to reach a good update of the 
map is obviously diminished.   
I am not interested in finding out 
whether crisis mapping “really helps” as 
Bharathi said because this new mode of 
living crisis exceeds the uptake of the map. 
Most certainly, crisis mappers do care about 
the effects of the maps that they are setting 
up. My point is not to say that these maps 
have no impact in the world. The Ushahidi 
Haiti team repeatedly states that their crisis 
map made an important difference in the 
first weeks following the earthquake (rescue 
operations, dispatching of resources, etc.). 
For many other coordinators, the mapping of 
corrupted and violent elections constitutes a 
form of political resistance.
9
 Of importance 
is that crisis mapping is accompanied by 
such a vast mobilization of people coming 
together around the condition of crisis. The 
outcome (success or failure) of their 
enrollment in terms of measurable effects 
does not change the fact that crisis mapping 
encourage individuals to become actively 
concerned by crises unfolding often times 
thousands of kilometers away from their 
ordinary living places. In this light, the 
multiple goals elaborated by Galya and Liz 
throughout the 2011 DRC deployment could 
be read as an attempt to stay in tune with the 
crisis regardless of the realization of their 
initial intention—getting accurate data on 
the elections. Precisely at stake is that this 
manner of living crisis reaches beyond crisis 
mapping’s practical applications: it is a shift 
toward the possibility of collectively caring 
                                                          
9
 The tangible influence (political, social, economic 
or otherwise) of crisis mapping is extremely difficult 
to determine as recognized by several consultants 
who had to come up with evaluative reports on 
Ushahidi deployments (see Morrow, Nathan et al., 
2011). How to disentangle practical interventions 
definitely rendered possible by the map from those 
that would have happened anyway? Such an 
assessment can easily turn into an unending 
counterfactual discussion.   
and acting on faraway crises with little time 
commitment or skill expectation.  
In the end, the potential triggered by 
the dynamic feature of the Ushahidi 
platform—easily and quickly participating 
in crisis—takes precedence over the 
epistemological and humanitarian 
advantages encompassed in the technique of 
mapping per se. The dynamic aspect of the 
Ushahidi platform was initially designed 
merely to serve an instrumental purpose, 
namely that of reaching the most accurate 
mapping of the crisis under scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, the “live” feature of the 
Ushahidi technology has taken a life of its 
own, as crisis mappers are drawn by the 
possibility of switching from passive 
spectators to active participants of crises.  
In Transductions: Bodies and 
Machines at Speed, the sociologist Adrian 
Mackenzie argues that the common vision 
permeating analyses of technology is that 
“the technical supports or supplements life, 
but would never constitutionally affect who 
or what the human is” (2002, 2). My 
ethnography of Ushahidi deployments 
advances a conclusion similar to that of 
Mackenzie. I propose that the technology of 
crisis mapping critically impacts what a 
crisis is about for Ushahidi participants. The 
materiality of the bodies (ability to type on a 
computer, to see the map), the technical 
features of the mapping tool (live map, 
Internet remote access, crowdsourced 
reports) as well as individuals’ interests and 
hope mingle to facilitate volunteers’ 
entrance into a crisis—and hence the taking 
form of this emerging collective. In the next 
section, I will show that this novl collective 
and active shared concern for crisis 
reconfigures what the condition of crisis 
means. 
 




Space of Crisis: Relationality beyond the 
Nation 
In a blog post dating back a year 
entitled “What is Crisis Mapping? An 
Update on the Field and Looking Ahead”, 
Patrick Meier wrote: 
“One interesting impact of 
Crisis Mapping that hadn’t 
occurred to me two years 
ago is the social connectivity 
aspect. What do I mean by 
that? Simply this: the value 
of Crisis Mapping may at 
times have less to do with 
the actual map and more 
with the conversations and 
new collaborative networks 
catalyzed by launching a 
Crisis Mapping project.” 
(2011a) 
Meier’s words suggest that in addition to the 
collective coming together during crisis, 
crisis mapping generates actual networks of 
people that outlast the duration of one 
particular crisis. An example of such 
formalized association is the already cited 
Standby Volunteer Task Force (SBTF). This 
is an initiative which comprises over 750 
subscribed members. The SBTF is activated 
precisely in times of crisis when a crisis map 
is deployed. However, members remain 
registered to the SBTF even when they are 
not engaged in any particular deployment. 
These people exchange regularly through 
Skype (I am part of their Skype group and I 
see people interacting at least every other 
day). The name of the Skype group is 
interesting in its own right: “SBTF General 
Chat Room - not for coordination of 
deployments, just for general chat!” Their 
“general chat”, where new volunteers are 
introduced and greet each other, centers 
mainly on issues surrounding crisis mapping 
and crisis interventions in particular (such 
simulation of deployments or sharing ideas 
and useful documents). 
 Therefore, this new mode of living 
crisis stimulates the development of a 
particular kind of relationality—a crisis-
based one. During our conversation, 
Bharathi had a lot to say about the 
importance of communication between 
volunteers for the success of deployments: 
“If handled well, the Skype 
chat is the best thing. I sent 
out a few surveys after a few 
deployments. I did that for 
the DRC 2011 deployment. 
People love Skype chats 
because people participate in 
deployments also to meet 
other people. Social ties and 
opportunities to meet people 
are very important. If there is 
one thing I have learned, it is 
that a good Skype chat is 
crucial. When you do virtual 
volunteering, it is impersonal, 
you know, you are sitting at a 
desk…so you are in dialogue 
[with your system]. So when 
you have a Skype chat, you 
can meet people … ok, you 
do not meet them in the true 
sense, but you can come 
together. It adds a human 
dimension. If you ask me, the 
Libya crisis map was a 
success because of the Skype 
chats…” 
Crisis mapping deployments weaves these 
spheres of association between people who 
live at extreme corners of the world, who 
have never met, and probably never will. 
Nonetheless, these individuals recognize 
themselves as a community through the 
condition of crisis because they share a 
concern for and involvement in it. Indeed, 
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the subtitle to the name of Standby Task 
Force is “online volunteer community for 
live mapping”. Furthermore, on the website 
of Ushahidi, there is a special domain called 
the Ushahidi Community where people list 
their deployments, exchange technical tips, 
etc. In this sense, the category of crisis 
becomes the pivot of relations that extend 
far beyond the crisis-affected setting and 
beyond the duration of one particular crisis.  
 My ethnographic description of this 
crisis mappers’ collective brings to mind 
Benedict Anderson’s well-known concept of 
“imagined communities”. Anderson claimed 
that: 
“It is [an] imagined 
[community] because the 
members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most 
of their fellow-members, 
meet them or even hear of 
them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their 
communion.” (2006: 6, 
emphasis in the original) 
Anderson explains that in these national 
communities citizens come together around 
some cultural categories or artifacts, such as 
shared language (2006: 44-6) Put 
differently, individuals identify as a 
community around a condition that they can 
all inhabit. In that, Anderson’s imagined 
communities and crisis mapping’s 
collectives are reminiscent of each other. 
Nevertheless, they diverge on one 
important point. The elements forging 
Anderson’s nations are, as just mentioned, 
indeed cultural. The language spoken, the 
books read, or the religion practiced differs 
between countries (or among sub-nationalist 
groups). The nature of these common 
abstract objects is tied to a particular 
national territory. On the other hand, the 
crises around which Ushahidi participants 
unite transcend national boundaries. 
Certainly, the crises mapped in Ushahidi 
projects usually happen in a specific region 
and most of these maps do not exceed 
national borders.
10
 However, volunteers 
usually precisely help maintaining crisis 
maps of countries which are not theirs (as 
mentioned earlier in this paper, Internet 
connections are most often disrupted in the 
crisis-affected region). Furthermore, a 
particular crisis in one country mobilizes 
people from many different countries. 
Indeed, the members of the SBTF come 
from over 70 countries. Whereas national 
belonging is grounded on citizens’ 
recognition of their unique cultural baggage, 
crisis mapping turns an event occurring in a 
nation state into a situation that concern 
every individual around the world in the 
remoteness of her home. Therefore, the form 
of relationality generated by Ushahidi 
projects specifically escapes the national 
framework of identification portrayed by 
Anderson.  
Anderson has also discussed maps as 
instruments used in the making of the nation 
state: maps that trace the history of a place 
and maps that become the logo of a country 
(2006, especially Chapter 10). Cartography 
helps to establish national boundaries out of 
a non-delimited landscape. As has been 
alluded to previously, Ushahidi default maps 
are grounded on this geographical division 
of the world into national units. Thus, the 
making of these crisis maps moves in the 
exact reverse direction than Anderson’s 
                                                          
10
 There is indeed today more and more talk of 
“global crises” such as the most recent financial crisis 
or SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome). Yet, 
most Ushahidi deployments have confined their 
efforts to mapping crises within the limit of one 
country. I have never seen an Ushahidi crisis map 
monitoring two countries at once. Other crisis 
mapping projects do map the “world”. See for 
example the platform HealthMap at 
http://www.healthmap.org/en/ 




maps: it starts from drawn national 
boundaries to pass into the realm of the 
supranational—the reports uploaded on the 
maps bearing witness to this global 
collaboration. If I showed in an earlier 
section of this essay (Presenting Maps) that 
crisis mapping platforms aim to democratize 
cartography, it could well be said that 
Ushahidi projects also globalize it.  
I would not dare to claim that crisis 
mapping alone suffices to radically 
challenge, and overthrow, nationalism (and 
nation-states). Anderson underlined too 
vehemently twenty years ago the 
fundamental dominance of nationalism to 
permit me such a statement. He wrote that: 
“The reality is quite plain: the 
‘end of the era of 
nationalism’ so long 
prophesied, is not remotely in 
sight. Indeed, nation-ness is 
the most universally 
legitimate value in the 
political life of our time.” 
(2006: 3) 
I want to argue nevertheless that crisis 
mapping is sketching the possibility that 
other values outside of nation-ness might 
already have their grips on our political life. 
Indeed, crisis mapping does not represent 
the crafting of smaller communities within 
the nation state (ethnic groups for instance) 
but a shift toward collectives above national 
boundaries. The mode of living crisis 
through  Ushahidi deployments unveils a 
collective organization in which individuals 
leap over their national origins to identify 
together in the condition of crisis.
11
  
                                                          
11
 Facebook also encompass members from around 
the world and on a much broader scale than crisis 
mapping collectives. However, I would argue that 
most people subscribe to Facebook in order to create 
their own profile and add other people’s profiles as 
“friends”—and to spend time browsing. Obviously, 
 In her analysis of the practice of 
mapping, the geographer Doreen Massey 
calls for a conception of space as: 
“the sphere of a dynamic 
simultaneity, constantly 
disconnected by new arrivals, 
constantly waiting to be 
determined (and therefore 
always undetermined) by the 
construction of new relations. 
It is always being made and 
always there, in a sense, 
unfinished space (except that 
the ‘finishing’ is not on the 
agenda).” (Massey 2005: 107, 
emphasis added) 
Building on her view, I contend that crisis 
mapping triggers a space of crisis. It is the 
space of this collective of crisis mappers 
growing, changing, continually in flux, 
which join together across nation states to 
help in and act on crises. Massey goes on to 
claim that “it is a map (and a space) which 
leaves opening for something new” (2005: 
109). In fact, through Ushahidi maps, a new 
relationality emerges centered on the sharing 
of a concern for crisis. Indeed, I have tried 
to show that crisis maps are maps the value 
of which is not about representing the 
geographical space undergoing a crisis. 
Rather, the significance of these maps 
resides in their generating an unfinished 
space of crisis, “constantly disconnected by 
new arrivals, constantly waiting to be 
determined (and there always undetermined) 
by the construction of new relations”, 
through their making and upkeep. As such, 
                                                                                       
the importance of Facebook on mass mobilization has 
been recognized during events such as the Arab 
Spring. But the fact remains that the majority of 
individuals do not join Facebook specifically to act 
on a particular situation, such as crises (or poverty), 
whereas crisis mappers do. I acknowledge that the 
points of difference between crisis mapping 
collectives and Facebook ones require a more 
thorough investigation. 
Gedeon Achi: Behind the Map
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
131 
 
crisis mapping expands the space of actual 
crises. 
Cazdyn has criticized our current 
articulation of the concept of crisis because 
it led to conceive of crises as multiplying 
and to put in place undemocratic procedures 
to counteract this proliferation. Crisis 
mapping does not reduce the occurrence of 
crises, but it perhaps democratizes crises by 
allowing anyone to contribute its concern to 
a (hoped for) more efficient crisis 
intervention—be it in terms of witnessing, 
humanitarianism, or gathering research data. 
The category of crisis becomes a place 
around which new relational networks are 
formed that outlive the duration of any 
singular crisis. This ethnography of 
Ushahidi hopes to have shown that crisis 
mapping reconfigures the category of crisis 
as a site of potential. In it, thehe concept of 
crisis stimulates a space, in Massey’s sense, 
above national boundaries. 
Conclusion 
This essay has attempted to show 
that at the core of crisis mapping lays a 
particular kind of cartography that asks us to 
‘look behind’ behind the map. Indeed, the 
representational modality of Ushahidi maps 
is not their core features; the physical 
locations they trace are not its most 
suggestive potential. Rather, the promise of 
crisis maps rests on the unusual object being 
mapped, namely crises. The technical 
specificities (designed to capture crises) of 
the production process of Ushahidi maps 
foster for its participants a different manner 
of living crisis. The latter is characterized by 
people collectively joining (each from their 
computer) to act on crises. Whether as 
election monitoring, as humanitarian 
prevention, or as data gathering, whether 
“successful or not”—these are all modes for 
Ushahidi participants to get involved in 
crises and form a global space (of crisis).  
 In his most recent book Insect 
Media, the media theorist Jussi Parikka 
encourages analysts to: 
“develop ways of 
understanding language less as 
information transmission and 
more, [in a way, loyal to Von 
Frisch’s initial metaphors,] as 
an embodied dancing that 
takes the world as its stage.” 
(Parikka 2010: 143) 
Crisis mapping helps analysts to do so. 
Crisis mapping’s value, I have argued, is not 
that of a map aimed at transmitting 
information. Rather, crisis mapping could be 
read as a language developed by its 
participants to convey the mode of being in 
the world that is appropriate for their 
aspiration. This language consists not solely 
of the reports put on the map, but also of the 
(diverse and shifting) intentions and 
motivations of crisis mappers as well as the 
crafting of a shifting (relational) space of 
crisis. Crisis mapping is perhaps envisioned 
as a way of (be)coming together with the 
world. Volunteers are not aiming to find a 
language that represents the world—but 
really one which takes the world as its stage. 
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